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ABSTRACT. How does epistemological disjunctivism relate to the wider issue of the nature 
of knowledge? I answer this question by considering how epistemological disjunctivism can be 
embedded within my own preferred theory of knowledge, anti-luck virtue epistemology. The 
motivation for the latter is outlined, and a case is made that not only is epistemological 
disjunctivism consistent with anti-luck virtue epistemology, but that the proposals are also a 
natural fit. It is further shown that the kind of strong (albeit non-classical) epistemic 
internalism that is integral to epistemological disjunctivism is entirely compatible with 
interpreting anti-luck virtue epistemology, qua a structural thesis about the nature of 
knowledge, along epistemic externalist lines. 
 
    
1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
 
One philosophical lesson that I have learnt over the years¾learnt the hard way, I might add¾is 
the importance of recognising when philosophical projects can be usefully run together, and when 
they really need to be kept apart. I’ve discovered more than once that projects that initially seemed 
to go naturally together are in fact to some significant degree orthogonal to each other. So, for 
example, in earlier work¾see especially Pritchard (2005)¾I had a tendency to suppose that one 
could usefully simultaneously offer an account of (i) knowledge in general, (ii) perceptual 
knowledge in particular, and (iii) how best to respond to the problem of radical scepticism. In fact, 
all three projects I’ve discovered¾eventually!¾need to be kept apart.  
 This point is relevant to our current purposes since now that I do keep these projects 
separate, it raises the question of how they all relate. In particular¾see, especially Pritchard 
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(2012b)¾epistemological disjunctivism is core to how I respond to project (ii). But I am also quite 
explicit that epistemological disjunctivism is not, thereby, an answer to project (i). Relatedly, 
although I claim that epistemological disjunctivism is part of the solution to (iii), I am (these days 
anyway) very clear that it is not the complete solution.1 And yet these three projects are clearly all 
closely connected, even if one would be mistaken in simply trying to answer them all at once. So 
how do they all relate to one another? 
 Since I have explored the question of how epistemological disjunctivism fits into a solution 
to the problem of radical scepticism at length elsewhere, my focus here will largely be on 
understanding how epistemological disjunctivism fits within an account of knowledge more 
generally.2 To that end, I will be locating this proposal within an approach to epistemology that I 
call anti-luck epistemology, and the theory of knowledge that goes along with that approach: anti-luck 
virtue epistemology.3  
 
 
2. ANTI-LUCK VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY 
 
It is widely held in epistemology that there cannot be lucky knowledge. This is the so-called anti-
luck intuition.4 The methodology behind anti-luck epistemology is that we should take this claim 
seriously by offering an account of both luck and of the specific sense in which knowledge is 
incompatible with luck. The thought is that by putting these two elements together we will be able 
to formulate, in a principled way, an anti-luck condition on knowledge. Sparing the reader the 
details somewhat, such a methodology, in my hands at least, leads, via a modal account of luck, to 
a defence of a specific formulation of the safety condition on knowledge. Roughly, to have 
knowledge is to have a true belief formed on a safe basis such that it could not have easily been a 
false belief, formed on that same basis.5  
 There is more to knowledge than merely non-lucky (i.e., safe) true belief, however. I have 
tried to make this point vivid via the following scenario. Imagine that the subject’s true belief is 
such that in all close possible worlds where the subject continues to form a belief on the same 
basis as in the actual world her belief continues to be true. The twist in the tale, however, is that 
what is underwriting the subject’s safe—and hence non-lucky—true belief has nothing to do with 
her exercise of relevant cognitive agency, but is rather the result of the epistemically helpful 
interference from another agent.6 The crux of the matter is that while the subject clearly has a safe 
true belief, since it isn’t rooted in her exercise of relevant cognitive agency it cannot count as 
knowledge. Merely having a non-lucky true belief thus cannot suffice for knowledge.  
 Such cases are meant to remind us that aside from the anti-luck intuition that guides the 
 3 
theory of knowledge there is also an ability intuition. This holds that a subject’s knowledge must in 
some substantive way be attributable to the subject’s exercise of relevant cognitive agency. The 
anti-luck and ability intuitions can at first blush seem like two sides of the same coin, and indeed 
they are often run together. Isn’t getting to the truth via one’s cognitive ability what excludes 
epistemic luck? Conversely, aren’t the conditions under which one gets to truth in a non-lucky way 
precisely those conditions where one has appropriately manifested one’s cognitive agency?  
 The case just described where one has a clearly safe true belief without thereby having 
knowledge should make us realise that these two intuitions are imposing distinct constraints on a 
theory of knowledge. In this scenario, after all, while there will be nothing at all lucky about the 
subject’s cognitive success (i.e., her true belief), the fact that this non-lucky cognitive success is not 
the result of her manifestation of relevant cognitive agency ensures that it doesn’t count as 
knowledge. In short, the anti-luck intuition is satisfied, but not the ability intuition.  
 Crucially, we can also describe cases in which the subject’s true belief is clearly attributable 
to her manifestation of relevant cognitive agency but where it is even so just a matter of luck that 
the belief, given how it was formed, is true (and hence the belief is unsafe). This is because a 
success, cognitive or otherwise, can be fully attributable to one’s (cognitive) agency even when 
there are features of the modal environment that nonetheless ensure that it is unsafe (i.e., it is a 
success which, given how it was brought about, could very easily have been a failure). In short, the 
ability intuition is satisfied, but not the anti-luck intuition.  
 These days I express this point in terms of what I call an epistemic twin earth case.7 Imagine 
two agents who are microphysical duplicates. They occupy a causally identical ‘local’ environment 
(i.e., the environment that they are currently causally interacting with), and have identical causal 
histories. Moreover, not only is their local environment identical, but also their ‘normal’ 
environment, where this concerns the features of the environment that they ordinarily causally 
interact with. The point of these stipulations is to keep fixed across the two subjects any possible 
factor that might be relevant to the attribution of agency. Now imagine that both subjects form a 
true belief in the very same proposition. The only way that our two agents’ situations differ is that 
for only one of them there are features of the modal environment that ensure that the belief so 
formed could have easily been false (for the other agent the true belief, so formed, could not have 
easily been false). One subject thus has an unsafe, and thus luckily true, belief, while the other 
subject does not. And yet their manifestations of agency, and thus cognitive agency, are bound to 
be identical, and hence the extent to which their cognitive success is attributable to their 
manifestation of relevant cognitive agency is bound to be identical too.  
 This means that a pure—or, as I put it, ‘robust’—virtue epistemology, which is a proposal 
that essentially defines knowledge in terms of virtuous true belief, is unsustainable (just as a pure, 
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or robust, anti-luck epistemology was argued to be unsustainable earlier).8 One’s cognitive skills 
and intellectual virtues are, after all, manifestations of one’s cognitive agency, and hence are ways 
of capturing the ability intuition. But as epistemic twin earth cases illustrate, success (including 
cognitive success) that is appropriately attributable to agency (cognitive or otherwise), can 
nonetheless be modally fragile, in the sense that it is a success that could have easily been a failure 
(even if, as in the cognitive case, we keep the basis for belief fixed). So unless the proponent of 
robust virtue epistemology is to reject the anti-luck intuition, and hence allow that there can be 
lucky knowledge, then their position is untenable.9 
 So the first kind of case demonstrates that there can be non-lucky true beliefs that don’t 
amount to knowledge because they are not attributable to the subject’s manifestation of cognitive 
agency. And the second kind of case (the epistemic twin earth case) demonstrates that there can be 
true beliefs that are fully attributable to the subject’s manifestation of cognitive agency while 
nonetheless being only luckily true (i.e., unsafe). The moral is that the anti-luck and ability 
intuitions, far from being two sides of the same coin, are in fact imposing distinct, albeit 
overlapping, constraints on a theory of knowledge. This means that no anti-luck condition alone 
will satisfy the ability intuition, and no ability (i.e., virtue) condition alone will satisfy the anti-luck 
intuition. It follows that a pure, or robust, version of either anti-luck epistemology or virtue 
epistemology will inevitably be unsound. 
 I conclude that we need a theory of knowledge that is duly sensitive to the distinct 
constraints imposed by these two master intuitions. In particular, notice that it would not be 
enough to simply bolt-on an anti-luck condition to a virtue condition. Aside from the fact that it 
would be easy to ‘Gettierize’ such a view—one just needs both conditions to hold, but for entirely 
independent reasons—it wouldn’t in any case capture the dialectical situation as just described. 
After all, that these two intuitions impose distinct conditions on a theory of knowledge does not 
entail that they impose independent epistemic conditions; indeed, since they are overlapping 
intuitions, we have every reason to treat them as not being independent.  
 Here is the theory of knowledge that I claim does fit the bill, anti-luck virtue epistemology 
(ALVE). This holds that one has knowledge when one has a safe (non-lucky) cognitive success 
(i.e., true belief) that is significantly attributable to one’s manifestation of relevant cognitive agency. 
A few points of clarification are in order regarding this account of knowledge. The claim that the 
safe cognitive success needs to be ‘significantly attributable’ to one’s manifestation of relevant 
cognitive agency means that one’s manifestation of relevant cognitive agency must play a 
significant part in a causal explanation of one’s safe cognitive success. Note that a significant part 
is not the same as being the primary or overarching part of the causal explanation, which is what 
would be required if the safe cognitive success were fully attributable to one’s manifestation of 
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relevant cognitive agency. In addition, notice that the explanatory relationship is between one’s 
manifestation of relevant cognitive agency and one’s safe cognitive success rather than one’s 
cognitive success simpliciter.  
 Putting these two points together, it follows that ALVE is both in a sense stronger (i.e., 
more demanding) and in a sense weaker (i.e., less demanding) than robust virtue epistemology. It 
is stronger, in that the explanatory relationship is not merely with one’s cognitive success but 
rather with one’s safe (non-lucky) cognitive success. But it is also weaker, in that while robust 
virtue epistemology is interested in whether one’s manifestation of relevant cognitive agency is the 
primary or overarching component of a causal explanation of one’s cognitive success, ALVE is 
only interested in whether it is a significant (but not necessarily primary or overarching) 
component in such a causal explanation (albeit now regarding one’s safe cognitive success).  
 It is the way in which the anti-luck and ability conditions on knowledge intersect in this 
fashion (i.e., as opposed to being independent) that enables ALVE to avoid the kinds of problems 
that face other proposals. That we have an anti-luck condition built in ensures that we do not need 
to worry about Gettier-style cases, including those, as in the epistemic twin earth case, where the 
subject’s lucky true belief is nonetheless fully attributable to her manifestation of relevant cognitive 
agency. And that we have an ability condition ensures that we can explain why knowledge is 
lacking in cases where the subject’s safe cognitive success has nothing to do with her manifestation 
of relevant cognitive agency, since the relevant explanatory demand is not met. But by weakening 
the nature of this explanatory relationship, we can also account for cases where an epistemically 
friendly environment ensures that the subject’s manifestation of relevant cognitive agency need 
not be the primary or overarching element in a causal explanation of her safe cognitive success in 
order for her to have knowledge, such as cases of easy testimonial knowledge.10   
 Note that ALVE is a structural proposal about the nature of knowledge, and as such a range 
of different theories of knowledge could be plugged into that structure.11 Consider, for example, 
how one ends up with a different way of thinking about knowledge if one treats the ‘relevant 
cognitive agency’ at issue in ALVE in terms of specifically intellectual virtues, rather more 
generally in terms of a wider class of cognitive traits (e.g., cognitive skills, faculties, and intellectual 
virtues). Given the essentially reflective nature of the intellectual virtues—not just in their 
application, but also in terms of their acquisition and maintenance—this would lead to a version of 
anti-luck virtue epistemology that was much closer in spirit to traditional internalist accounts of 
knowledge (i.e., those views which incorporate an internalist justification condition) than a 
competing position cast in terms of a broader notion of cognitive agency.  
 We can thus distinguish between ALVE as a structural proposal, and particular renderings 
of the ALVE thesis. For what it’s worth, my own preferred rendering of ALVE—let’s call this 
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ALVE*, to differentiate it from the more general, structural thesis—is along epistemic externalist 
lines. I claim that the relevant sense of cognitive agency in play is one that doesn’t essentially 
involve the intellectual virtues, or otherwise demand good reflectively accessible reasons on the 
part of the subject. I maintain that sometimes at least merely manifesting one’s cognitive agency in 
completely unreflective ways—such as when we appropriately engage our reliable cognitive 
faculties and in doing so form safe beliefs—can suffice for knowledge. So even though mature 
human knowledge might well tend to involve subjects having good reflectively accessible reasons 
in support of their beliefs—and even, one might hope, the manifestation of intellectual virtue—I 
would claim that this is not required for knowledge. 
 
 
3. ANTI-LUCK VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY 
AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM 
 
While ALVE is a theory of knowledge in general, epistemological disjunctivism, at least as I 
present the view at any rate, is specifically a claim about perceptual knowledge in paradigmatic 
conditions. This proposal holds that one’s perceptual knowledge in such conditions enjoys rational 
support that is both reflectively accessible and factive. In particular, it maintains that one’s 
perceptual belief in the target proposition, p, is supported by the factive reason that one sees that p 
(which entails p), where this is factive rational support that is reflectively accessible to the subject.12  
 It is the combination of the rational support being both reflectively accessible and factive 
that makes the view distinctive. According to traditional views in epistemology, ‘internalist’ 
reflectively accessible rational support is by its nature non-factive. Indeed, internalist epistemic 
support is meant to not be world-involving at all, in the sense that it epistemic support that one’s 
beliefs would enjoy even if those beliefs were radically false.13 Conversely, there are varieties of 
epistemic support that are world-involving, in the sense of being, if not factive, then at least such 
that they entail empirical claims about the world (think, for example, of a reliability condition on 
knowledge), but these ‘externalist’ varieties of epistemic support are held not to be reflectively 
accessible. Epistemological disjunctivism, if coherent, thus offers a kind of epistemic internalism 
(via the reflective accessibility of the rational support) about the type of knowledge in question 
that can nonetheless incorporate aspects of epistemic externalism (in virtue of involving epistemic 
support that is directly world-involving, via the factivity of the rational support in play).14  
 I’ve defended the view at length elsewhere, so I don’t propose to review the arguments for 
and against epistemological disjunctivism here. Instead, I want to focus on how such a position 
should be understood within the wider ALVE theory of knowledge. As I just noted, I only 
 7 
understand epistemological disjunctivism as being about a specific kind of knowledge. On my 
view, it isn’t even concerned with perceptual knowledge in general, but only with paradigm cases 
of perceptual knowledge. But it is at least consistent with thinking of epistemological disjunctivism 
as applying to a particular kind of knowledge that it applies to all knowledge (in the sense that an 
epistemological disjunctivist thesis about knowledge in general would obviously entail an 
epistemological disjunctivist thesis about paradigmatic perceptual knowledge). Would such a 
generalised epistemological disjunctivism about knowledge be compatible with ALVE? 
 Construed as a thesis about knowledge in general, epistemological disjunctivism would be 
a fairly radical form of (non-classical) epistemic internalism about knowledge. It would demand 
not just that all knowledge is supported by good reflectively accessible reasons (i.e., of a kind that 
would satisfy an internalist justification condition), but that all knowledge is supported by 
reflectively accessible factive reasons.15 Such a view strikes me as implausible. The idea that one’s 
reflectively accessible reasons could be factive in cases of paradigm perceptual knowledge trades 
on the fact that sometimes at least the relevant fact to be known is made utterly manifest to one, 
as when one sees a pig before one in optimal conditions for pig perception. But not all perceptual 
knowledge is like that. Sometimes what we see is more suggestive, as when we see a curly tail go 
behind a wall in a pig pen. That might also lead to knowledge that a pig is present (knowledge 
which is at least significantly perceptual), but it doesn’t seem to be in any obvious way supported 
by a reflectively accessible factive reason. Indeed, in the normal case anyway, it seems to be rather 
supported by a collection of non-factive reflectively accessible reasons of the usual epistemic 
internalist kind. Alternatively, of course, one could embrace epistemological disjunctivism about 
knowledge in general and hence argue that genuine knowledge is not possessed in these scenarios 
involving mere non-factive reflectively accessible rational support, but of course that would be a 
very restrictive account of knowledge to offer.  
 In any case, putting concerns about the cogency of the proposal to one side, it ought to be 
clear that there isn’t any obvious tension between epistemological disjunctivism construed as a 
general theory of knowledge and ALVE. Remember that ALVE is a structural proposal, and hence 
compatible with a range of different interpretations. Could a generalised epistemological 
disjunctivism not be one of them? The issue rests on whether we can think of knowledge 
supported by reflectively accessible factive reasons along the lines set out by ALVE. This, in turn, 
rests on what kinds of conditions epistemological disjunctivism claims need to be in place in order 
for one’s beliefs to enjoy such rational support. On my presentation of epistemological 
disjunctivism, at least, the conditions in play are very demanding, as befitting the fact that one only 
has this kind of rational support in epistemically paradigmatic perceptual conditions. In particular, 
one’s veridical perception has to be the result of one’s perceptual faculties functioning 
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appropriately in epistemic conditions that are both objectively and subjectively good (this is what I 
refer to as the ‘good+’ case, to differentiate it from merely ‘good’ scenarios where the epistemic 
conditions are only objectively good). This means that not only is the subject in epistemic 
conditions that are in fact ideal for the subject to gain perceptual knowledge, but that these 
epistemic conditions also seem to the subject to be ideal for the gaining of perceptual knowledge 
(e.g., there are no misleading defeaters in play).16  
 With the conditions for the obtaining of factive reflectively accessible reasons 
characterised in this epistemically demanding fashion, then it is fairly plausible that in satisfying the 
rubric for epistemological disjunctivism the subject will thereby satisfy the corresponding rubric 
for ALVE. Let’s begin with the anti-luck element of ALVE. If one’s basis for belief is a factive 
reason, then the safety condition is straightforwardly met, as clearly one cannot form a belief on 
that same basis in close possible worlds and yet believe falsely.17 This shouldn’t surprise us, given 
that one needs to be in epistemic conditions that are both objectively and subjectively good in 
order to enjoy the factive reason in play. In particular, objectively good epistemic conditions are 
explicitly defined as being conditions that put one in a position to know, to the extent that so long 
as one appropriately forms one’s belief in those conditions, then one will acquire knowledge. This 
is how poor subjective epistemic conditions can prevent knowledge even when the objective 
epistemic conditions are optimal. A misleading (undefeated) defeater, for example, would prevent 
knowledge, since it would preclude one from appropriately forming a belief in the target 
proposition, even if the epistemic conditions are objectively good. Given that objective epistemic 
conditions are understood in this fashion, it shouldn’t be surprising that the subject has a basis for 
belief that would ensure truth not just in the actual world but also in the subject’s modal 
neighbourhood. The point is thus that in order to have reflective access to the factive reason, the 
subject must have a true belief that is safe. 
 Moreover, notice that the safety of the subject’s belief, based on the reflectively accessible 
factive reason, is also significantly attributable to her manifestation of relevant cognitive agency. 
For remember that it is not just that factive reasons are only reflectively accessible to the subject in 
epistemic conditions that are objectively and subjectively good, but also that the subject herself has 
to be cognitively functioning in an appropriate manner. This means that having reflective access to 
the factive reason in play must go hand-in-hand with one’s appropriate cognitive functioning in 
this regard. Accordingly, given that these properly functioning cognitive capacities are generating 
factive reasons, which are in turn ensuring that one’s beliefs so formed are safe, one would expect 
that one’s safe cognitive success ought to be at least significantly (if not primarily) attributable to 
one’s exercise of relevant cognitive agency.  
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4. LOCALISED EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM WITHIN ALVE* 
 
Epistemological disjunctivism, construed as a general theory of knowledge, is thus compatible with 
ALVE. But as I noted earlier this would be a rather implausible account of knowledge, and thus an 
unattractive way of fleshing-out an instantiation of the ALVE schema. This leads us to the more 
interesting question of how to think about the relationship between the kind of localized 
epistemological disjunctivism that I defend—whereby knowledge is supported by factive 
reflectively accessible rational support in specific conditions—and ALVE. I noted above that my 
preferred way of cashing-out the ALVE schema—ALVE*—is cast along epistemic externalist 
lines. This proposal allows that the manifestation of cognitive abilities in the broadest sense—
where this includes mere cognitive skills and innate cognitive faculties, in contrast to intellectual 
virtues, specifically—can generate knowledge. Given that epistemological disjunctivism is meant to 
capture key epistemic internalist insights, one might think that ALVE*, as an epistemic externalist 
thesis, must be in at least some dialectical tension with it. On the contrary, I want to suggest that 
ALVE* and a localised epistemological disjunctivism are natural bedfellows.  
 Notice that even though ALVE* is an epistemic externalist thesis it is still meant to 
accommodate at least some of the intuitions that drive epistemic internalism, and in particular the 
idea that knowledge demands cognitive responsibility. In this respect, ALVE* follows the model 
of virtue-theoretic proposals in the theory of knowledge more generally. It is in the nature of one’s 
cognitive abilities, and which makes them more than just reliable belief-forming processes, that 
they are integrated aspects of one’s cognitive character. This is why knowledge that is attributable 
to one’s manifestation of relevant cognitive ability is thereby attributable to one’s cognitive agency, 
and thus to one’s cognitive character. In this way, knowledge on this view directly brings with it 
the notion of cognitive responsibility, in a way that a mere process reliabilism about knowledge 
does not.18 Where ALVE* departs from a version of ALVE that insists on the intellectual 
virtues—and which thus insists that knowledge arises out of intellectual character specifically—is 
that the latter brings in a more beefed-up up notion of cognitive responsibility, one that is far 
more reflective given the nature of the intellectual virtues. But either way there is a substantive 
notion of cognitive responsibility in play in all virtue-theoretic accounts of knowledge.19  
 As an epistemic externalist thesis, ALVE* doesn’t demand that the subject should have 
any reflectively accessible reasons in support of her true belief in order for that belief to amount to 
knowledge (though, as noted above, it is consistent with this point that most mature human 
knowledge does tend to be so supported). All that is important is that this true belief is formed in 
such a way that it is safe and this safety is significantly attributable to the subject’s manifestation of 
relevant cognitive ability (and is thus attributable to her cognitive agency). When ALVE* is 
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combined with epistemological disjunctivism, however, then there will be a paradigm kind of 
perceptual knowledge that is supported by reflectively accessible reasons; indeed, supported by 
reflectively accessible reasons of a particularly robust kind in virtue of being factive.  
 Now one might think that the robustness of the internalist epistemic support at issue with 
epistemological disjunctivism in epistemically paradigm cases entails, even in the context of 
ALVE*, the manifestation of the relevant intellectual virtues. I don’t think that this follows. In 
general, being sufficiently proficient in adducing reflectively accessible (and usually non-factive) 
reasons will tend to require some degree of manifestation of intellectual virtue, but I don’t think 
that this applies to the kind of factive reasons available according to epistemological disjunctivism 
(even despite them being factive). This is because such factive reasons are meant to be epistemic 
standings that one is entitled to by default. If there is nothing to alert one (or should alert one) to 
there being anything epistemically amiss, and in fact there is nothing epistemically amiss, then one 
thereby has the factive reason available to one.  
 It is in this sense that such factive reasons are not ‘earnt’, in that one doesn’t need to 
actively do anything from a rational point of view in order to acquire them. In particular, they 
don’t require any specific reasoning on the part of the subject, in the way that other kinds of 
rational beliefs do. In this sense, then, they are not the result of ratiocination, or otherwise 
grounded in ratiocination. One has to be inducted into the relevant epistemic practice, of course, 
and one’s cognitive agency needs to be functioning appropriately and suitably attentive to relevant 
environmental conditions (which, note, might not require any particular kind of conscious 
monitoring of that environment; being able to spot when conditions are abnormal does not 
require a conscious monitoring of when they are normal). But beyond that, there is nothing from a 
specifically rational point of view that is required of the agent in order to have access to them.20  
 So while epistemological disjunctivism allows for an elevated (factive) kind of internalist 
epistemic standing, it doesn’t intellectualise what that epistemic standing involves. Indeed, it is 
interesting to note how well epistemological disjunctivism and ALVE* sit together in this respect. 
In being inducted into the epistemic practices of one’s community, and thereby being such that 
one counts as a believer at all, one has both externalist and a strong kind of internalist knowledge 
made available to one. In the former case, this is through one’s appropriate exercise of one’s 
cognitive abilities and faculties. In the latter case, this is specifically through one’s appropriate 
exercise of those cognitive abilities and faculties leading to one having reflective access to factive 
reasons. In neither case does one need to be a particularly reflective, much less intellectually 
virtuous, subject. The point is rather that one’s appropriate manifestation of one’s cognitive 
abilities and faculties can thereby put one in direct epistemic contact with the world. In the best 
case, this delivers knowledge grounded in factive reflectively accessible reasons.  
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 The acquisition of the intellectual virtues, and thus the kinds of good reflective cognitive 
traits that go with them, such as good reasoning, is something that comes after one’s acquisition of 
factive reasons. This signals the fact that these involve cognitive traits that are intellectually more 
sophisticated, even though they marshal reflectively accessible reasons that are typically non-
factive. This should not surprise us. Consider what it takes to make a complex observation of 
one’s environment (i.e., as opposed to merely passively perceiving one’s environment), of a kind 
that essentially involves intellectual virtue. To be observant, in the sense relevant to intellectual 
virtue, is to be able to interrogate one’s surroundings for salient information. This will mean 
attending to important details of what one sees and drawing inferences appropriately, suitably 
informed by one’s background knowledge. Even if factive reasons play some role in this 
reasoning, there will inevitably be non-factive reasons also in play. More importantly, the resulting 
beliefs will be buttressed by a complex piece of reasoning that delivers good, but defeasible, 
rational support. Even though the rational support that results is non-factive, this kind of 
justification of one’s belief generates a form of knowledge that is paradigmatically internalist. 
Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to think that internalist knowledge is always of this 
intellectualist kind, or even that this kind of internalist knowledge offers the strongest form of 
epistemic support for one’s beliefs. Knowledge supported by factive reasons enjoys stronger 
epistemic support, but is also a kind of internalist knowledge that is cast along non-intellectualist 
lines.  
 The combination of ALVE* and epistemological disjunctivism enables one to have a 
broadly externalist theory of knowledge that can also incorporate core insights from epistemic 
internalism. Indeed, it is a theory of knowledge that has factive internalist knowledge at its heart, in 
a non-intellectualist guise. This highlights an important point about epistemological disjunctivism, 
something that is brought into sharp relief when it is set within ALVE*, which is that although it 
offers us a particularly robust kind of internalist epistemic support, it does not follow standard 
forms of epistemic internalism in treating our reflective rational processes as epistemically 
privileged. Our epistemic position is not one of reasoning from an epistemically secure ‘inner’ 
reflective realm to derive conclusions about an epistemically insecure ‘outer’ realm. Rather, our 
cognitive grip on reality is ensured by the development of cognitive skills that have been acquired 
through induction into a social epistemic practice, and which bring with them factive, reflectively 
accessible reasons. In this sense, a grip on the ‘outer’ realm precedes a mastery of any ‘inner’ realm 
involving reflective rational processes, where the former enables the latter, rather than being 
derivative on it.  
 This last point also highlights the importance of combining ALVE* with epistemological 
disjunctivism. The former by itself, after all, doesn’t secure a decisive reflective cognitive grip on 
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reality at all. Without epistemological disjunctivism, that is, one gets at most defeasible reflectively 
accessible rational support of the usual kind. But this is not enough, as the problem of radical 
scepticism demonstrates. In particular, as I’ve argued elsewhere, epistemological disjunctivism is 
the antidote to the underdetermination-based formulation of Cartesian scepticism, where anything 
else is either too weak to be effective, or too revisionary to be intellectually satisfying in response 
to the paradoxical nature of this sceptical puzzle. ALVE* may thus be an adequate account of 
knowledge, but it lacks the resources by itself to show that widespread knowledge is possible, and 
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1  To be fair, this wouldn't have been clear from Pritchard (2012b), though there are good reasons for this—for 
example, I wanted that book to stand alone, and hence not be dependent on any wider philosophical theses that might 
be thought contentious. For my complete response to the problem of radical scepticism, which locates 
epistemological disjunctivism as part of a larger ‘biscopic’ treatment of the problem that incorporates Wittgensteinian 
insights, see Pritchard (2015b). See also Pritchard (2016a).    
2  As noted in endnote 1, I offer a detailed account of how epistemological disjunctivism fits within a wider response 
to radical scepticism in Pritchard (2015b).  
3  For the key works developing anti-luck epistemology, see Pritchard (2004; 2005; 2007a; 2008b; 2012c; 2015a). For 
the key works developing anti-luck virtue epistemology, see Pritchard (2009a; 2009b; 2009c; 2012a; 2016d; 2017) and 
Pritchard, Millar & Haddock (2010, chs. 1-4). Note that in recent work I have argued that our focus should not be on 
epistemic luck but rather on the closely related notion of epistemic risk, and hence that we should develop an anti-risk 
epistemology (and thus an anti-risk virtue epistemology). See Pritchard (2015d; 2016c; forthcominga; forthcomingb). Since the 
differences between epistemic luck and epistemic risk do not concern us here, I will set this complication to one side 
in what follows. See also endnote 9. 
4  Which, of course, is not to say that there isn’t dissent (in philosophy there is nearly always dissent). See, for example, 
the exchange between Hetherington (2013) and Pritchard (2013) on this question. Note that even those who accept 
the general thesis about the incompatibility of knowledge and luck might still diverge about how they interpret this 
claim. For example, as I explain below (see endnote 9), some proponents of a robust form of virtue epistemology are 
willing to allow that knowledge can be lucky in certain quite specific ways.  
5  For a list of the key works defending anti-luck epistemology, and the notion of safety that goes with it, see endnote 
3. For specific defence of the modal account of luck, see Pritchard (2014; cf., 2005, ch. 5). For some of the key 
defences of safety, see Luper (1984; 2003), Sainsbury (1997), Sosa (1999), and Williams (2000, passim). 
6  See, for example, the ‘temp’ case that I offer and explore in Pritchard (2009b, chs. 3-4; 2012a; 2016c, chs. 3-4) and 
Pritchard, Millar & Haddock (2010, ch. 2-3).  
7  See Kallestrup & Pritchard (2014) and Pritchard (2016b). See also endnote 8. 
8  For some of the key defences of robust virtue epistemology, see Sosa (1991; 2007; 2009; 2011; 2015), Zagzebski 
(1996; 1999), and Greco (2003; 2007a; 2009a; 2009b; 2012), though note that there are significant differences between 
these authors (none of which are relevant for our current concerns). Epistemic twin earth cases are essentially 
refinements of a previous critique that I offered of robust virtue epistemology, which is that while it can offer a 
principled basis for eliminating a certain form of knowledge-undermining veritic epistemic luck that I call intervening 
epistemic luck, it lacks the resources to eliminate a second kind of knowledge-undermining veritic epistemic luck that I 
call environmental epistemic luck. Epistemic twin earth cases essentially concern the kind of problem cases involving 
environmental epistemic luck. More generally, I claim that successes that are attributable to agency—i.e., achievements, at 
least according to some proponents of robust virtue epistemology—whether cognitive or otherwise, are compatible 
with environmental luck. See Pritchard (2009a; 2009b; 2009c; 2012a; 2016d; 2017) and Pritchard, Millar & Haddock 
(2010, chs. 1-4). Robust virtue epistemology is to be contrasted with ‘modest’ (or ‘impure’) virtue epistemology which 
holds that an ability, or virtue, epistemic condition on knowledge is at most a necessary condition. As we will see, the 
anti-luck virtue epistemology that I defend is a version of modest virtue epistemology. I present and explore this 
distinction between robust/pure and modest/impure virtue epistemology in a number of places—see, for example, 
Pritchard, Millar & Haddock (2010, chs. 1-4) and Pritchard (2012a; 2016d).   
9  Some robust virtue epistemologists explicitly acknowledge the potential modal fragility of our manifestations of 
agency, including cognitive agency, most notably Sosa (2007, ch. 5). But rather than taking this to show that there is 
more to knowledge than virtuous true belief, they instead argue that knowledge can sometimes involve lucky true 
belief. I discuss Sosa’s view in particular on this front in Pritchard (2009a). See also Pritchard (2012a), where I examine 
the more general issue of whether robust virtue epistemology should grant that there can be lucky knowledge. One of 
the advantages that I claim anti-risk epistemology (and thus anti-risk virtue epistemology) has over anti-luck 
epistemology (and thus anti-luck virtue epistemology)—see endnote 3 for more on this distinction—is that it is better 
placed to explain why robust virtue epistemology would be unwise to allow that there can be lucky knowledge, since 
they would be committed to ascribing knowledge to subjects even when there is a high epistemic risk of error. See 
Pritchard (2016c; forthcominga; forthcomingb) for further discussion of this point.  
10  For further discussion of such cases in this regard, see Pritchard, Millar & Haddock (2010, chs. 2-3) and Pritchard 
(2012a; 2016d, chs., 3-4). Elsewhere I have characterised these cases in terms of positive epistemic dependence (where a 
subject knows even despite her cognitive agency playing a relatively low explanatory role in her safe cognitive success), 
in contrast to the negative epistemic dependence at issue in epistemic twin earth cases (where the subject’s cognitive agency 
plays an overarching explanatory role in her safe cognitive success and yet she still lacks knowledge). See Pritchard 
(2016b) for further discussion.  
11  For more on this point, see Pritchard (2012a; 2017). 
12  For the key text where I defend epistemological disjunctivism, see Pritchard (2012b). See also Neta & Pritchard 
(2007) and Pritchard (2007b; 2008a; 2011a; 2011b; 2015b; 2015c; 2016e; 2018; forthcomingc).   
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13  This is the upshot of the so-called new evil genius intuition, which is rejected by epistemological disjunctivism. The loci 
classici in this regard are Lehrer & Cohen (1983) and Cohen (1984). For a helpful general discussion of the new evil 
demon intuition and its epistemological significance, see Littlejohn (2009). See also endnote 14. 
14  As I explain in Pritchard (2011b), epistemological disjunctivism represents a non-classical form of epistemic 
internalism, in that while it embraces the characteristic internalist thesis of accessibilism, and is at least consistent with 
another characteristic internalist thesis (mentalism), it rejects a third characteristic internalist thesis (the new evil 
demon intuition). See also Neta & Pritchard (2007) and endnote 13.   
15  My presentation of epistemological disjunctivism is inspired by the account of knowledge offered by McDowell 
(e.g., 1995). Although the matter is not entirely clear, there are passages that suggest that McDowell may well hold that 
something like epistemological disjunctivism (not his terminology but mine) is the right way to think about knowledge 
in general; he certainly holds that the view has application beyond perceptual knowledge. See, for example, McDowell 
(1994).   
16  For further discussion of the good+ case, along with a taxonomy of different types of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ cases, see 
Pritchard (2011a; 2012b, part 1).   
17  There are some complex issues raised by the basing relation as it applies to epistemological disjunctivism, though it 
would take us too far afield to explore them here. For discussion, see Pritchard (forthcomingc).  
18  See, for example, Greco’s (1999) seminal presentation of virtue reliabilism, including how it departs from, and 
thereby improves on, earlier process reliabilist proposals. 
19  That all virtue-theoretic accounts of knowledge are devoted to capturing a substantive notion of cognitive 
responsibility gets obscured by the fact that proponents of epistemic internalist forms of virtue epistemology are often 
characterised as virtue reponsibilists, in contrast to the virtue reliabilism defended by epistemic externalist virtue 
epistemologists. But this categorisation in fact just signals that a particularly robust form of cognitive responsibilti8y is 
being defended. The issue is further complicated in the literature by the fact that many virtue responsibilists explicitly 
eschew the project of defining knowledge altogether. For some of the key defences of virtue responsibilism, see Code 
(1987), Montmarquet (1993), Hookway (2003), Zagzebski (1996), and Roberts & Wood (2007). For more on the 
distinction between virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism itself, see Axtell (1997).  
20  It is important to note that while factive reasons might be in this sense ‘uneant’ according to epistemological 
disjunctivism, this doesn’t mean that the epistemic standing they provide is a form of epistemic entitlement, at least as 
that notion is usually understood anyway—e.g., by Burge (e.g., 1993; 2003) and Wright (e.g., 2004). In particular, the 
factive epistemic reasons are meant to be genuine positive reasons (indeed, entailing reasons) for believing the target 
proposition.  
21  I explore these issues in detail in Pritchard (2015b, passim). In particular, I argue there that we need to treat the 
contemporary version of Cartesian radical scepticism as in effect two distinct (but overlapping) sceptical problems, 
one that turns on the closure principle and another that trades on an underdetermination principle. Epistemological 
disjunctivism provides us with the resources to effectively deal with the latter. (But not the former. For that, one needs 
to combine epistemological disjunctivism with a Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology, a combination which I claim 
offers us a complete, ‘biscopic’, treatment of this kind of radical scepticism).  
22  I am grateful to Casey Doyle and Joe Milburn for comments on a previous version of this paper.  
